Peter Guidi's Blog

Posts Tagged ‘House Financial Services Committee’

More Durbin confusion from the Fed, will they or won’t they; Bernanke Agrees!

In alternative payment, Convenience Store, credit card, debit card, interchange, merchants, payment, retailers, swipe fees on March 31, 2011 at 10:11 pm

This week Federal Reserve Board Chairman Bernanke sent a mixed message by stating that the Fed won’t be able to meet the April 21st rule making deadline but will meet the July 21st deadline for imposing the rules set by the Dodd-Frank Act for regulating the debit card business. This seemingly contradictory statement raises the question; how can the impacted businesses prepare and be ready for the rules implementation without knowing the final requirements within the prescribed time. Advocates on both sides of the issue cheered the news as another sign that their cause would carry the day.

Retail groups applauded Bernanke’s statements as a commitment to move forward and implement the rules set forth in the Durbin Amendment. One industry representative stating “This confirms the Fed’s commitment to putting forth a rule that has been thoroughly vetted” adding “there is no need for a congressional mandated delay.  

Meanwhile opponents of the legislation lined up for battle pinning their hopes on exactly that type of congressional mandated delay as Sen. Jon Tester attached the “Debit Interchange Fee Study Act” to the Small Business Reauthorization Act. Passage of this act would move Durbin into a two-year obscurity as quickly as it originally appeared.

The confusion now extends to consumers who are equally puzzled as more information on Durbin’s impact makes it into the main stream press. Last week a Time Magazine article by Bill Saporitio explained to consumers that they may see lower retailer prices as a result of lower fees while warning that free checking may also vanish along with rising bank fees. Hilary Shelton, Washington Bureau Director for the NAACP echoed the same concern when she testified saying “that Regulators should guarantee it (the rule) wouldn’t push poor and minority consumers out of the banking systems”. Consumers are left wondering, is this good or bad? 

(http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

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Who gets to choose? Durbin’s provision on “multi-homing” and the prohibition on network routing exclusivity.

In credit card, debit card, interchange, merchants, payment, Peter Guidi, Platforms, retailers, swipe fees on January 29, 2011 at 2:18 pm

Here is the question:  When considering Durbin’s requirement prohibiting exclusive debit transaction routing arrangements, does the merchant or issuer choose which second unaffiliated network is available to route transactions? The answer is unclear and its implications impact both the intent of the regulation and the technology required to implement the rule.

Thus far, the majority of interest in Durbin is focused on the impact of interchange fee regulation with little attention on the second aspect of the provision; network exclusivity and transaction routing. Durbin has two provisions, the second of which says “that neither the issuers nor network may restrict the ability of merchants to direct the routing of the transaction”.  The rule is intended to foster competition between networks. The concept being that when at least two unaffiliated networks compete for transaction routing, the price merchants pay will optimize.

The Board is requesting comment on two alternative rules prohibiting network exclusivity: one alternative would require at least two unaffiliated networks per debit card, and the other would require at least two unaffiliated networks for each type of transaction authorization method. Under both alternatives, “the issuers and networks would be prohibited from inhibiting a merchant’s ability to direct the routing of an electronic debit transaction over any network that may process such transactions.” Some have suggested that the answer to this question lies in the currently available least-cost routing selections available to consumers between PIN and Signature debit. In this scenario debit cross-routing is the solution to network exclusivity. One expert suggests that “one such solution would be Visa for signature debit and Maestro for PIN debit. They are not affiliated, and thus fulfill the requirements of the first alternative.” The existence of the second alternative makes it clear that the Fed has not yet decided whether signature and PIN debit are one market.”

The contradiction is between the intent of the regulation and the Boards’ rule making process.  The differentiation between routing based on a transaction or a card may delineate the type of routing available, but it does little to foster routing competiveness. The intent of the regulation is to foster competition between networks.  Allowing the Issuer to choose the second network by pitting the PIN and Signature networks against each other is a weak proposal. On the other hand, if merchants choose the second network from a multitude of routing options competition will emerge, but how does that work? In order for the merchant to have a choice between a variety of networks, Issuers would have to support routing on all networks. In this scenario merchants might choose different networks on a location or regional basis? Implementing this type of network routing matrix will mean substantial changes in the infrastructure and business rules. The time and effort to create such a system is currently unknown. If competition between networks is the congressional goal this seems to be the correct interpretation.

The alternative interpretation is for the Issuer to offer the merchant a choice of two networks. In this case every Issuer would be forced to offer two networks for processing a transaction.  As an example, Visa and MC may have to route each other’s transactions. The merchant would be able to choose which of the two available networks to route the transaction.  Presumably, creating competition. As a result the merchant would choose the cheaper of the two. However, this scenario does not assure the merchant choice and adds the possibility that the Issuer could offer a second network with higher fees. In this case the second network would be the more costly option resulting in no opportunity for merchant savings.

How a two-network solution is allowed under the final version of the regulations remains unknown. It does seem that merchant choice fits congressional intent more clearly than Issuer choice, even if the technical challenges and costs to develop such a system are currently not contemplated or that the rule making process appears to miss the point.

(http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

Debit or Credit, the role of merchant-issued rewards and the consumer’s choice of method of payment.

In credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, merchants, payment, swipe fees on December 28, 2010 at 10:45 am

On December 16, 2010 the fog began to lift on where Section 1075 of the Durbin Amendment would lead as the Federal Reserve Board issued its proposed interpretation of the legislative language. One question on many peoples mind is how the new regulations will impact consumers. Voices on the banking side seem skeptical that the regulation will have any positive impact for consumers sighting Australian studies where retailer prices appear unchanged as bank fees rose and payment options declined.  On the other side of the argument, the National Retail Federation welcomed proposed regulations saying “a significant reduction in the fees would result in lower costs for merchants and could lead to discounts for their customers.”

NRF Senior Vice President and General Counsel Mallory Duncan said. “The combination of reducing rates and allowing retailers to offer discounts will go a long way toward stopping the current scheme where big banks take a bite out of consumers’ wallets every time they use a debit card.” He goes on to say that the NFR “will work closely with the Fed as these regulations are finalized to ensure that the reduction in fees – and the amount of money retailers can offer customers as a discount – is maximized.” And so it seems that the stage is set for retailers to offers consumers discounts if and when they use a debit card to pay for their purchase.

In a recent article published in PYMNTS, Katherine M. Robison of O’Melveny & Myers LLP says that “while the Board says it understands and appreciates the importance of debit cards to consumers, it is disturbing how little the interests of consumers entered into its justification for the Proposal”.  She goes on to say that “The debit card market is a two-sided one, with merchants who accept debit cards on one side and consumers who use them on the other.” Her point being that in this two-sided market an action that may decrease consumers’ demand for debit (say by making debit transactions less appealing to them) will ultimately decrease the utility of debit to merchants.  Further, if Banks add fees to the checking account or the use of the debit card while eliminating reward programs consumers will also find debit less appealing. She adds “So while lower interchange fees may encourage more merchants to accept debit cards, at that point there may be fewer consumers who want to use them.” Enter the role of merchant issued rewards.

Consumers could benefit from a rewards battle between merchants and banks for their method of payment. On one side will be the issuers of credit cards, on the other will be the retailer and the winner could be consumer as they rack up rewards by choosing either credit or debit. Their choice will be simple, choose to use a bank issued credit card and earn rewards like airline miles, or choose a debit card (either bank or merchant issued) and earn retailer funded rewards. The decision will be based on which offer the consumer finds more attractive? 

Over the last five years a variety of alternative payment providers. Like National Payment Card Association, have brought forth payment technologies like merchant issued debit cards designed to circumvent the traditional payment processing network delivering a lower cost transaction to the retailer. Now with the Fed’s proposed interpretation of the rule, bank issued debit cards will carry similar fees and so the retailers will face an analogous implementation challenge. How does a merchant motivate a consumer to use a lower cost form of payment? Merchant rewards are the obvious answer. And so the question is; will retailers recapitalize the cost difference between a traditional credit card transaction and the new debit fee and use the savings as a reward? And if not, why would the consumer choose to use a debit card rather than a credit card? Retailers will face a variety of challenges leveraging these new fees to their advantage.  Most notably is that the possibility that a debit transaction with merchant funded rewards may actually cost more than the original bank fee for a debit transaction. 

(http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

“Reasonable and proportional”, issuance and rewards are out, Fraud is in!”?

In alternative payment, credit card, debit card, interchange, merchants, payment, Payment card, retailers, swipe fees on June 24, 2010 at 1:56 pm

Last week I discussed the operational costs associated with issuing cards and retaining members and postulated that the Fed should include these costs in the analysis of “reasonable and proportional costs associated with a transaction”. One reason these costs might be included is to support the competitive product offerings consumers receive from banks to enroll in the various programs that are offered. The expectation being that if these costs are not considered a part of the reasonable cost of the transaction, then the programs would need to be eliminated, thus limiting consumer choice. With the Durbin Amendment nearing agreement and inclusion in the final bill, it now appears that the answer to the question is; no, the regulation says these costs are not included in the Fed’s evaluation used to establish debit interchange fees. The deal reached between Messer’s Frank and Durbin expanded the meaning of “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred in processing the transaction” to include the cost of fraud in its analysis, a recognition of risk associated with payment card issuance. Moving forward, Financial Institutions have good reason to remain concerned about the Fed’s price setting authority as the language for assessing costs is limited to “incremental costs” excluding operational and other costs like issuance and rewards.

The wild card remains the $10 billion exemption. Watch for a multitude of creative corporate structural changes and new programs from entities’ falling below the threshold. If you think the rate table is confusing now, wait until the banks attorneys’ drive through the Durbin Amendments’ loop-holes! 

(http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

“Reasonable and proportional”, is issuance and the cost of reward programs a part of the “incurred payment processing costs”?

In alternative payment, Bank Tax, credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, merchants, payment, Payment card on June 17, 2010 at 9:34 pm

Lost in the debate over interchange fees and the Durbin amendment is a focus on how payment card products reach the consumer. One of the key points of the amendment is to mandate that the interchange fees on selected debit transactions be “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred in processing the transaction” Merchants have taken the position that as the volume of transactions have increased, the economies of scale and overall effectiveness and efficiencies of the payment processing network have improved, and therefore the cost of transaction processing have gone down. The fact that interchange has gone up during this period is used as evidence that system is corrupt and anti-competitive. This point is heard when Senator Durbin says that government needs to “reasonably regulate this system”.

Missing from the debate on interchange and what constitutes the costs incurred in processing a transaction is consumer acquisition. Consumer acquisition costs are incurred in at least two areas; enrollment (consumer application) and rewards (loyalty programs & retention), to say nothing about overhead, like customer service. This week both Citigroup and TD Bank launched new “Debit Rewards” programs. Citigroup launched a 5% debit card cash back promotion, while the TD Bank program offers 1 point for every $1 dollar spent. In both cases, these reward programs are only available to consumers who use signature rather than PIN debit. As a consumer, which program should I choose? These are two highly competitive businesses, each offering me a product and a service. Each has put their best foot forward and is universally accepted. Both have used a different approach; one uses point’s, one utilizes cash back, and the choice is mine. If the Durbin amendment is successful and retailer acceptance is selective, and interchange fees regulated, would the consumer have these same choices?

Merchants involved with loyalty programs understand the costs associated with advertising and marketing to drive enrollment and fund reward programs. Industry sources report that up to 40% of all interchange dollars paid by merchants are used to support payment card loyalty programs. That means, in 2008, consumers may have earned up to 19 billon dollars in consumer rewards; a cost borne by the merchant, but also a cost to the issuer (bank).

The suggestion is that high fees are a result of no competition in the payment card market. In reality, the high fees are a result of intense competition. It just happens, that the competition is between banks (issuers) fighting for the consumers’ business.

(http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

Does regulated debit “Swipe Fees” mean the end of cobranded debit card programs?

In alternative payment, Bank Tax, credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, merchants, payment, Payment card, retailers on June 4, 2010 at 8:16 pm

Retailers choosing “open-loop” or “closed-loop” alternative payment system might want to consider the long term viability of the open-loop business model, particularly in light of their campaign to regulate and lower the associated “swipe fees”. 

Affinity, cobranded credit card programs have opportunities for both the bank and the merchant. While the “no or low fee” in-store use of the cobranded card is a big attraction, Retailers also profit from cobranded credit cards when consumers use the card to make purchases. When a consumer uses a co-branded credit card, the accepting merchant pays the “swipe fee”.  The cobranded merchant earning “swipe fees” is an example of network effects in a two-sided market. In this example, the merchant is leveraging their customers to market a bank product. Organizations that have the marketing to reach their customers will get the response needed to make the program successful. Ironically, much of the success will be a result of the high fees paid by the merchants who pay the “Swipe Fees”. 

Retailers evaluating merchant issued ACH decoupled debit card programs consider the same model while evaluating their choice of “Open”, or “Closed” loop payment systems. The question is can the decoupled debit card generate revenue for the issuing merchant in the same way cobranded credit card products do. Ironically, the answer all depends on the “swipe fee” the 3rd party merchant pays when the consumer uses the card. The higher the fee, the more successful the program. 

In order for an ACH decoupled debit card to work in an open loop system the card must affiliate with a bank, and a network. Today’s interchange rates for PIN debit are already comparatively low. The challenge for cobranded cards is to offer a level of consumer rewards that will motivate the consumer to use the card. This is the reason that debit rewards programs are offered for signature debit and not pin debit transactions. As Merchants anxiously await the passage of the much ballyhooed Durbin amendment, they might consider its impact on the cobranded card. If “swipe fees” for debit are regulated, (decoupled debit card programs included) there will be no dollars in the program for either the consumer, or the cobranding retailer. If the consumer does not receive rewards to use the card, and the retailer is not earning money from the program, the network effects driving the value of the platform will be eliminated, making the cobranded credit/debit card program obsolete.    (http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

73rd NPECA Annual Conference – What is alternative payment

In alternative payment, Bank Tax, credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, merchants, payment, Payment card, retailers, Uncategorized on April 28, 2010 at 11:21 pm

There are at least two possible ways to answer the question; “What is alternative payment?” one practical, one academic.

Practically, any payment solution that is not MasterCard or Visa is alterative payment. This is true because up to 90% of all card acceptance fees occur at the pump and these two associations, along with AMEX and Discover control a monopolistic percentage of the payment market. Practically, any payment other than the major card associations is an alternative payment. An Academic approach to the question is more elusive.

Suppose that “alternative payment” is a payment where the payment relationship is between the retailer and the consumer. If so, then cash is the ultimate alternative payment?  But what about all the emerging payment systems like NPCA or PayPal, Bling or BillmeLater? Are they alternative payment? What if we changed the meaning to say that: “alternative payment is any system that creates disintermediation between consumers, retailers and their financial institutions”. Does eliminating the network roles and captured costs of the current payment processing network define alternative payment or is there more?

For the convenience petroleum retailer alternative payment is a system that disintermediates the transaction while enhancing the customer relationship. Alternative payments systems allow the retailer to focus on the “Demand-Side” of payment using incentives and tracking data to influence the consumers “Method of Payment” and enhance customer loyalty. The result should be lower card acceptance costs and increased sales. Retailers using this definition will find the final answer to the question, alternative payment is one that delivers additional profit, rather than additional cost to the retailer.

What decision factors should retailers use when choosing between an open-loop vs. closed-loop alternative payment solutions?

In alternative payment, Bank Tax, credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, merchants, payment, Payment card, retailers on April 22, 2010 at 3:31 pm

Prevailing wisdom is often wrong.  Mark Twain said: “Every generalization is dangerous, especially this one”.

The prevailing wisdom on payment is that open-loop systems are superior to closed-loop systems. Open-loop payment systems have four stakeholders; consumer, merchant, issuer, and network. It is generally accepted that successful payment systems offer the consumer at least three attributes; simplicity, safety and desirability. This has lead to the mantra that only ubiquitous payment products can achieve “top of wallet” status. The reason being that the consumer wants one method of payment rather than multiple options as a matter of convenience; consequently, it’s simple and desirable.

Yesterday, Target announced they are dropping its Visa cobranded program. The Target program was one of Visa’s largest cobranded programs. This decision is the strongest sign yet that merchants are reevaluating the benefits of offering general-purpose credit cards. Target said they tested a Target credit card and that research indicated that the Target credit card drove more sales. The test made a clear case for its private-label cards over general-purpose cards. So much for “prevailing wisdom”.

Closed-loop payments systems have two stakeholders, the consumer and the merchant. When a payment system creates disintermediation between issuer and the network (acquirer) the result is increased engagement between the retailer and the consumer. Engagement is good for business. If consumers are interested in single purpose cards, as Target’s test indicated, why share the relationship with two other parties?

Prudent retailers will consider the results of Target’s decisions and other trends in payment before making a final payment system decision. Recent research indicates that 38% of consumers will reduce the use of their credit cards. Visa has reports that debit usage has surpassed the use of credit. Last week VISA announced an increase in Debit rates. Retailers looking to leverage these emerging payment preference trends should consider closed-loop ACH decoupled debit. (http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi)

Petitions or competition? The “Supply-Side” & “Demand-Side” of the two-sided payment market.

In alternative payment, Bank Tax, credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, payment, Payment card on April 8, 2010 at 11:25 am

Most consumer payments involve some form of banking relationship. Mobile and other P2P payment providers like the newly launched “Square” offer the allure of disintermediation promising the end of the banks control over payment. But for now, retailers looking for lower transaction costs at the POS; the choices are limited, with most involving a card and all involving a financial institution (bank).

Retailers considering alternative payment need to under stand the “Demand-Side” of payments. Currently few retailers deal with the “demand-side” of payment; rather they deal with the “Supply-Side. The “Supply-Side” perspective of payments focuses on the network through which the payments are settled. 

The Demand-Side of payment systems has to do with the choices consumers make when selecting a “Method of Payment”. For most convenience/petroleum retailers this means a sticker on the front door or pump announcing which payment cards are accepted. Other “Demand-Side” promotional opportunities come from major oil or co-branded cards. Banks (card issuers) understand the importance of the “Demand-Side” and focus their efforts on influencing the consumers’ Method of Payment. Competition for the consumer’s payment choice or the Demand-Side is influenced by the banks and networks through affinity & reward programs promoted through extensive advertising and marketing paid. Retailers support these programs through Interchange Fees. 

In any two-sided market there are two groups of end users who need a “platform” to reach each other. In the case of payments, consumers with credit/debit card and retailers who want access to those consumer funds represent the two groups of End-Users. Their desire to reach each other is called a “network effect”. When banks focus on the ‘Demand-Side” of consumer payment choice by offering rewards, they are increasing the strength of the network effect. When Retailers focus on the supply side of the of consumer payment choice, accepting the cards and offering no alterative, they are adding to the strength of the network effect. The result of strong network effects is greater platform value resulting in higher fees. 

Successfully launching alternative payment programs means that retailers will need to focus on both the supply and demand sides of consumer payment choice.http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi

The convergence of payment and loyalty programming and the trends influencing consumer payment behavior.

In alternative payment, Bank Tax, credit card, debit card, interchange, loyalty, payment, Payment card on March 30, 2010 at 11:52 am

Confluence is the act of flowing together; the junction of two or more bodies of water; the place of meeting. Like two rivers, convenience store operators navigate both payment and loyalty relationships. The confluence of these two programs is the card and the consumer. Data suggests that retailers can recapitalize “Swipe Fees” as “Rewards” by leveraging consumer’s willingness to participate in loyalty programs and their increased preference to use debit payment.

According to “The Big Sort, 2009 COLLOQUY Loyalty Marketing Census, in 2008, 51 million consumers participated in Fuel/Convenience loyalty programs.  2009 saw the further expansion of loyalty with a number of retailers launching new programs. That same year, 422 million consumers participated in Financial Services loyalty programs (credit/debit rewards). While the convenience store industry was hammered by low margins under onerous interchange fees, financial institutions used up to 45% of the “Swipe fees” to drive their business forward, achieving nearly ten times the number of participants. 

The January 2010 version of “The 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice” published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston reveals data demonstrating consumer’s increased participation in debit rewards programs.

\The two studies point to specific trends that support the confluence of loyalty and payments. Consumers now belong to an average of 14.1 loyalty programs, but only 3.5 credit cards. The average consumer has adopted 5 “Payment Instruments”. More consumers have and use debit cards than credit cards (88.2% vs. 78.3% w/ 208% increased usage). Consumers have more “loyalty” to their debit card than credit card with 27.5% of consumers discarding a credit card, while only 5.9% reported discarding a debit card. The analysis indicates that consumers are more willing to join a loyalty program than a payment program. Further when customers use a card for debit, they are less likely to discard the program making for a double win; more enrollment with less attrition.     

The conclusion is that growth in Fuel/Convenience loyalty programs and increased debit card usage considered in juxtaposition with the high rate of attrition of credit card users suggests that retailers offering debit rewards as a feature in the loyalty program could recapitalize a significant percentage of “Swipe Fees” as consumer rewards resulting in greater consumer loyalty and increased ROI.

http://www.linkedin.com/in/peterguidi